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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE 39, MASSACHUSETTS

SECURITY INFORMATION

File
Disarmament
July 21, 1952

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I enclose for your files two papers bearing on our panel's work. One is the official text of the three power proposal on the numerical limitation of armed forces, of 28 May, 1952, and the second is a proposed supplement to this working paper suggested by Ambassador Cohen. I have also asked the Department of State to send on to you the more complete file of the speeches and responses made by the western powers and the USSR on the occasion of the presentation of this proposal on numerical limitation. The proposed supplement seems to me to be a particularly ingenious document, in that it aims to kick the ball into the opposing side. The difficulty with it, of course, is that it runs at once into the wide open question, "Who is China?" My information is that it is on this ground that the proposal is still being kicked back and forth in the Department and the Foreign Office. - *still later hope is that they have agreed*

I have checked methods of transport between Cambridge and Washington, and I am bound to admit that except for the Federal Express, they are not too hot. The quickest plane Washington to Boston is one which leaves at 6 p.m. and arrives here at 8:02 in the evening, daylight saving time. The best plane the other way leaves at nine in the morning and arrives at Washington at 10:42, also daylight saving time. The former is American, the latter Eastern. The general run of planes, which you can get at nearly any convenient time, take about three hours in transit, although American also has one which leaves Washington at 9:15 a.m. and arrives at Boston at 11:41. Unless you are thoroughly allergic to train travel, I suspect that the most convenient method of movement is to take a bed on the Federal Express which leaves, of course, at eleven in the evening at both ends and arrives shortly after eight the following morning.

to ignore this matter. The proposal in some form is likely to be made in August by Cohen.

In any case, I hope you will not find this information so discouraging as to make you give up hope of joining us for several days in Cambridge at some stage in our August deliberations. I think that if I could know within the next week or two what your plans are, I can almost surely persuade the other members of the panel to adjust their movements to match.

State Dept. review completed

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Mr. Allen W. Dulles

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July 21, 1952

It was very good to see you in Washington, and I hope that you enjoyed the rest of the events of the week, (in Chicago, I mean) as much as I did. I cannot, up to now, get myself very much worked up over the democratic operation, but perhaps after it has gone on a month or two I will feel differently. I see no reason why it should not continue forever, unless Adlai Stevenson changes his mind; *but it looks as if he will.*

As ever,

Mar

McGeorge Bundy

McGB:mtb

2 Enclosures



UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION



GENERAL

DC/10
28 May 1952

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the United States of America: Working Paper setting
forth proposals for fixing numerical limitation
of all armed forces

The delegations of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which sponsored the resolution of the General Assembly establishing the Disarmament Commission, are today submitting the attached working proposals for the determination of over-all numerical limitations on all armed forces.

In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic, have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of States and the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security.

The proposals suggest that there should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. A ceiling between 1 million and 1.5 million is suggested for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and China, while a ceiling between 700,000 and 800,000 is suggested for the United Kingdom and France.

The proposals call for agreed maximum ceilings for all other States having substantial armed forces to be fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world, thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the population and should be less than current levels, except in very special circumstances.

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/The proposals
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The proposals envisage substantial and balanced reductions in armed forces. Agreement on such reductions should greatly lessen the likelihood and the fear of successful aggression and should facilitate agreement on other essential parts of a comprehensive disarmament programme, including the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and the effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

Working Paper setting forth proposals for fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces, submitted by the Representatives of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

A. Introduction

1. Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952

"Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only."

2. Paragraph 6 of the resolution

"Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;

(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the over-all limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments."

3. The present working paper presents a plan for the determination of over-all numerical limitations on the size of the armed forces of States. Obviously some over-all limitations on the size of the armed forces of States are an essential part of any comprehensive plan for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. The working paper is not intended to

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exclude, but to facilitate the development of other essential components which must be included in what the preamble of the General Assembly resolution refers to as "comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" including "safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all... nations [whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system]." Proposals have already been submitted on certain other essential components, i.e., the control of atomic energy and disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments. By submitting this working paper and focusing attention on another component we hope to facilitate progress toward an agreed comprehensive programme.

B. Standards for determining numerical limitations of all armed forces

4. In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic, have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of States and the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security.
5. The following working formula is suggested as a basis of discussion:

(a) There should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America which should be worked out with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security among themselves or with other States and thus reducing the danger of war. It is tentatively suggested that the maximum ceilings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and China should be the same and fixed at, say, between 1 million and 1.5 million, and the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be the same and fixed at, say, between 700,000 and 800,000.

(b) For all other States having substantial armed forces there should be agreed maximum ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view

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to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the population. Moreover, they should be less than current levels except in very special circumstances.

C. Significance of over-all numerical limitations

6. While a nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed strength, and other elements of armed strength will have to be considered in any comprehensive programme for the balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, nevertheless a numerical limitation on armed forces is a major element in any such programme for the following reasons:

(a) All armaments programmes depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces.

(b) A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in itself would tend to reduce the likelihood of successful aggression.

(c) Agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction of armed forces, minimizing the likelihood and fear of successful aggression, should greatly facilitate agreement reducing and restricting the armaments supporting these armed forces.

D. Implementation of proposals for numerical limitations of all armed forces

7. In determining the numbers in the armed forces, all kinds of armed forces, including para-military and security forces, must be included.

8. Adequate provision must be made to ensure that the maximum limitation on armed forces is not circumvented through building up large forces of trained reserves or militarily trained police.

9. This system must be accepted by all States, whether or not Members of the United Nations, whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system.

10. There should be adequate safeguards throughout the process of reduction to ensure that limitations are put into effect and observed as agreed and that violations can be promptly detected.

11. The implementation of the reductions should be closely related to progress in connexion with other phases of the programme for regulation, limitation and

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balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, such as the control of atomic energy and the system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification.

12. The reduction should be carried through in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ and should be completed within the shortest feasible time after its commencement.

13. In the future, further numerical limitation of permitted armed forces would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved toward the easing of international tensions, and the agreed ceilings would be subject to review at stated intervals.

14. The proposed limitations - including their relationship to other components of the programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of weapons adaptable to mass destruction - should be comprehended within the treaty or treaties required under paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952.

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6/13/52

Disarmament to Tripartite Working Paper Regarding
Numerical Limitations on All Armed Forces.

If the proposals for the fixing of numerical limitation on all forces—land, sea and air—are approved in principle by the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission should be authorized to initiate the following procedures:

1. To request China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to submit

(a) a list of the principal categories of armed forces and the numbers of the armed forces within each category that they would consider necessary and appropriate to maintain within the overall numerical ceilings proposed for their armed forces, and

(b) a list of the types and quantities of armaments (excluding all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, including atomic and bacteriological) which they would consider necessary and appropriate to support the permitted armed forces within the proposed numerical ceilings.

2. Upon the receipt of such lists, to request the five countries to confer with a view to reaching tentative agreement on the distribution of permitted armed forces within stated categories and the types and volume of armaments appropriate to support permitted armed forces. It is contemplated that the distribution of armed forces within stated categories or the types and volume of armaments should not necessarily be identical for the five countries inasmuch as their needs and responsibilities may be different. The objective of the agreement would be to reduce the possibility and fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security. The agreement would be tentative as it would have to be

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reviewed in light of the further tentative agreements to be reached under paragraph 3 with other countries.

3. Upon the conclusion of the tentative agreement referred to in paragraph 2, to arrange for a number of regional conferences to be attended by all states having substantial military forces in the respective regions for the purpose of reaching similar tentative agreement on the overall numerical ceilings for the armed forces of all such states, the distribution of the permitted armed forces within stated categories, and the types and volume of armaments necessary and appropriate to support the permitted armed forces.

4. To work out a draft treaty or treaties in which the tentative agreements referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 could be included for consideration of a conference of all states. Among other things such treaty or treaties must provide for the establishment of an international control organ with adequate and effective authority to supervise and control the execution of the treaty or treaties and to ensure and safeguard the observance thereof and protect complying states from the hazards of violations and evasions. The control organ must have adequate and effective authority to see to it that all armed forces other than the agreed permitted armed forces are prohibited and not maintained, that all armaments other than the agreed permitted armaments are prohibited and eliminated, and that atomic energy is controlled to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only. (It should be clearly understood that all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction including atomic and bacteriological weapons would be excluded from the agreed permitted armaments).

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① Memo nuclear test - in
a new field

② Responsibility on T.N. Test
to be shared - No more
tests ?

③ Tests known

④ No hoped Dis. unless Sov agree
on something definite - Not to test
needed examination

R.O.

- ① Disclosure of where we are
- ② No "strategic attack".
- ③ Test standstill

④ No use of H-bomb

- ① Respond to request for advice
- ② Suggest steps for now -
- ③ Plan for conv. arrangements
- ④ Review Baruch Plan
- ⑤ Thought for future -
